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Jurnal

Journal of Financial Economics

Keyword

Pengarang

  1. Messod D. Beneish
  2. Cassandra D. Marshall
  3. Jun Yang

    Subject

    1. ECONOMIC
    2. FINANCIAL

      [Abstrak]

      We propose a framework that advances our understanding of Chief
      Executive Officer (CEO) retention decisions in misreporting firms.
      Consistent with economic intuition, outside directors are more likely to
      fire (retain) CEOs when retention (replacement) costs are high relative
      to replacement (retention) costs. When the decision is ambiguous
      because neither cost dominates, outside directors are more likely to
      retain the CEO when they both benefit from selling stock in the
      misreporting period. We show that joint abnormal selling captures
      director–CEO alignment incrementally to biographical overlap. This new
      proxy operationalizes information sharing and trust, making it useful
      for studying economic decision-making embedded in social relationships.

      Periode

      Vol 123, Nomor 3, Tahun 2017

      [Berkas]

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